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Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) is a popular deep policy gradient algorithm. In standard implementations, PPO regularizes policy updates with clipped probability ratios, and parameterizes policies with either continuous Gaussian distributions or discrete Softmax distributions. These design choices are widely accepted, and motivated by empirical performance comparisons on MuJoCo and Atari benchmarks. We revisit these practices outside the regime of current benchmarks, and expose three failure modes of standard PPO. We explain why standard design choices are problematic in these cases, and show that alternative choices of surrogate objectives and policy parameterizations can prevent the failure modes. We hope that our work serves as a reminder that many algorithmic design choices in reinforcement learning are tied to specific simulation environments. We should not implicitly accept these choices as a standard part of a more general algorithm. 

When predictions support decisions they may influence the outcome they aim to predict. We call such predictions performative; the prediction influences the target. Performativity is a well-studied phenomenon in policy-making that has so far been neglected in supervised learning. When ignored, performativity surfaces as undesirable distribution shift, routinely addressed with retraining. We develop a risk minimization framework for performative prediction bringing together concepts from statistics, game theory, and causality. A conceptual novelty is an equilibrium notion we call performative stability. Performative stability implies that the predictions are calibrated not against past outcomes, but against the future outcomes that manifest from acting on the prediction. Our main results are necessary and sufficient conditions for the convergence of retraining to a performatively stable point of nearly minimal loss. In full generality, performative prediction strictly subsumes the setting known as strategic classification. We thus also give the first sufficient conditions for retraining to overcome strategic feedback effects. 

Consequential decision-making incentivizes individuals to strategically adapt their behavior to the specifics of the decision rule. While a long line of work has viewed strategic adaptation as gaming and attempted to mitigate its effects, recent work has instead sought to design classifiers that incentivize individuals to improve a desired quality. Key to both accounts is a cost function that dictates which adaptations are rational to undertake. In this work, we develop a causal framework for strategic adaptation. Our causal perspective clearly distinguishes between gaming and improvement and reveals an important obstacle to incentive design. We prove any procedure for designing classifiers that incentivize improvement must inevitably solve a non-trivial causal inference problem. Moreover, we show a similar result holds for designing cost functions that satisfy the requirements of previous work. With the benefit of hindsight, our results show much of the prior work on strategic classification is causal modeling in disguise. 

In performative prediction, the choice of a model influences the distribution of future data, typically through actions taken based on the model's predictions. We initiate the study of stochastic optimization for performative prediction. What sets this setting apart from traditional stochastic optimization is the difference between merely updating model parameters and deploying the new model. The latter triggers a shift in the distribution that affects future data, while the former keeps the distribution as is. Assuming smoothness and strong convexity, we prove rates of convergence for both greedily deploying models after each stochastic update (greedy deploy) as well as for taking several updates before redeploying (lazy deploy). In both cases, our bounds smoothly recover the optimal O(1/k) rate as the strength of performativity decreases. Furthermore, they illustrate how depending on the strength of performative effects, there exists a regime where either approach outperforms the other. We experimentally explore the trade-off on both synthetic data and a strategic classification simulator. 

In this paper, we propose Test-Time Training, a general approach for improving the performance of predictive models when training and test data come from different distributions. We turn a single unlabeled test sample into a self-supervised learning problem, on which we update the model parameters before making a prediction. This also extends naturally to data in an online stream. Our simple approach leads to improvements on diverse image classification benchmarks aimed at evaluating robustness to distribution shifts. 

While real-world decisions involve many competing objectives, algorithmic decisions are often evaluated with a single objective function. In this paper, we study algorithmic policies which explicitly trade off between a private objective (such as profit) and a public objective (such as social welfare). We analyze a natural class of policies which trace an empirical Pareto frontier based on learned scores, and focus on how such decisions can be made in noisy or data-limited regimes. Our theoretical results characterize the optimal strategies in this class, bound the Pareto errors due to inaccuracies in the scores, and show an equivalence between optimal strategies and a rich class of fairness-constrained profit-maximizing policies. We then present empirical results in two different contexts — online content recommendation and sustainable abalone fisheries — to underscore the generality of our approach to a wide range of practical decisions. Taken together, these results shed light on inherent trade-offs in using machine learning for decisions that impact social welfare.